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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 





GAYLE LEE BOONE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Unlawful Distribution of 
a Controlled Substance for Value in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(a) (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury in the court of the 
Honorable James s. Sawaya, Judge, in the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
On June 17, 1977, appellant was found guilty as charged and 
sentenced to a term of zero to ten years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the verdict 
below. 
SThTEMENT OF FACTS 
In January, 1977, Detective Tom Carlson of 
the Bountiful Police Department met Kayle Shaw, a former 
drug user, who was incarcerated in the Salt Lake County 
Jail. Shaw informed Carlson that he wanted to be an 
undercover narcotics agent (T.l7,256). After his release 
from jail, Shaw had given the narcotics agents a list of 
approximately fourteen names of persons he had bought drugs 
from and whom he would help prosecute through controlled 
narcotics purchases (T.l28). During the months of Februa~ 
March and April, Shaw, known undercover as Mike Days, made 
controlled buys from nine different persons (T.261). 
One such controlled buy was arranged on April 2C, 
1977, when Shaw and appellant agreed that Shaw would pay 
the $1,000 price quoted by appellant for an ounce of THC 
(T.27,29) (THC is the street name for tetrahydrocanibol, 
the active ingredient in marijuana). 
On April 27, 1977, at about 5:00p.m., Shaw cal~ 
appellant at The Gym, 2827 South 2300 East, an exercise 
-2-
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establishment frequented by appellant (T.346, 350), and asked 
if appellant had the THC (T.25). Appellant reponded that he 
had it and told Shaw to come to The Gym to get it (T.25). 
Shaw then telephoned Tom Carlson at the 
office of the State Narcotics Law Enforcement Division at 
the Utah State Fairgrounds and told him the delivery was 
set (T.26). On arrival at the Fairgrounds office, Shaw was 
strip-searched, provided with $1,000 in bills which had been 
xeroxed and whose numbers had been separately listed, wired 
with a hidden, electronic transmitter and given a code 
phrase to use to report that the buy had been made; all 
standard procedures for undercover narcotics purchases (T.26, 
173,175). Detective Carlson also searched Shaw's car and 
found no narcotics secreted there (T.l73). At approximately 
5:45 p.m. Shaw drove directly to The Gym, with six cars and 
twelve agents following close behind (T.30,174). On arrival 
at The Gym, appellant told Shaw to take a break because "his 
man" had not arrived yet (T.35). Shaw drove to the 7-11 Store 
at 3300 South 2300 East, followed by Agent Allred and Detective 
Carlson (T.36,180). Once again Shaw was patted down before 
returning to the exercise club (T.26,180), where appellant 
remarked that his delivery man would be driving a white 
Continental. A white Continental Mark IV arrived at 7:15; 
Shaw went inside the building (T.47). A few minutes later 
_,_ 
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appellant entered the club and gave Shaw a plastic bag 
which contained a brown powder (proven to be PCP 
[phencyclidine, an animal tranquilizer)) ('l'c 308), e~fter 
Shaw had counted out and given appellant (identified by 
Shaw atT.28) $1,000 (T.51). Shaw transmitted the pre-
arranged signal to show that the buy had been made (T.52), 
and appellant and Shaw left the building. Appellant got 
into the passenger side of the white ContinPntal driven 
by a man identified by Agent Allred as David Albo, co-
defendant in the trial (T.l87). Narcotics agents swarmed 
over the scene, appellant and Albo were arrested, Agent 
Fullmer recovered from Albo $980.00 of the money supplied 
to Shaw, and Shaw was placed under mock arrest (T.53,188,1' 
288). Agent Moore and Shaw initialed the baggie containi~ 
the PCP, sealed it in a yellow packet, and Moore stored it 
the evidence locker until it was dispatched to Bruce Beck' 
a toxicological analysis (T.296,300-301). 
ARGmlENT 
POINT I 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND UTAH CODE AN:; 
§§ 76-9-401, 402 (SUPP. 1977), ALLO\v WARRANTLESS ELECTRONIC 
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Appellant argues that the plurality opinion of 
Justice White in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 28 
L.Ed.2d 453 (1971), is a misstatement and misanalysis of 
the law concerning privacy and electronic eavesdropping. 
He urges this Court to reject this Supreme Court inter-
pretation of case law and constitutional standards and asks 
this Court to hold that warrantless electronic monitoring 
of a volunteer participant in a controlled drug purchase 
violates the constitutional right of privacy and is 
unreasonable search and seizure of the conversation. 
Respondent submits that the White decision is correct and 
logical and represents the current law in the area of 
privacy and warrantless electronic searches. 
In White, a case very similar to the instant 
case, the trial court overruled appellant's objections to 
testimony by government agents regarding conversations 
between the accused and an informant which the agents 
overheard by monitoring the frequency of a radio trans-
mitter concealed on the informant. The prosecution was 
unable to locate and produce the informant at trial. 
Relying on Katz v. United States, 389 u.s. 347, 19 L.Ed.2d 
576 (1967), which held inadmissible recordings of 
conversations made by government agents by means of a 
listening device attached to the outside of a public 
-5-
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telephone booth, the Seventh Circuit Court of i>ppeals 
reversed White's conviction. On certiorari, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the Circuit decision. 
In an opinion joined by Burger,Chief Justice, 
Stewart, Justice, and Blackmun, Justice, Mr. ,Tustice 
Whiteconfronted the issue of: 
" • whether the Fourth 
Amendment bars from evidence the 
testimony of governmental agents 
who related certain conversations 
which had occurred between defendant 
White and a government informant, 
Harvey Jackson, and which the agents 
overheard by monitoring the frequency 
of a radio transmitter and concealed 
on his person." 28 L.Ed.2d at 456. 
(Mr. Justice Black concurred and qujckly disposed of the 
Fourth Amendment claim, citing his dissent. in Katz v. Unit' 
States, 389 u.s. at 591, wherein he stated that the framer' 
of the Constitution had not intended to restrict or outl~ 
use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, with wiretappin· 
merely a sophisticated form of eavesdropping.) 
The Court acknowledged that Katz v. United State 
389 U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) 1 overruled Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 u.s. 438, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928), and~ 
v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 86 L.Ed. 1322 (1942), whic 
held that an actual physical trespass or invasion was re~ 
before the Fourth Amendment protections against unreasona 
-6-
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searches and seizures arose, therefore exempting wiretapping 
and electronic eavesdropping which originated beyond the 
curtilage of a home. Katz, supra, held inadmissible 
recordings obtained from a listening device placed on the 
outside of a phone booth without defendant Katz's knowledge 
or consent, where the government agents had not obtained 
a search warrant, thereby violating the privacy on which 
Katz had justifiably relied. 
The White Court distinguished and limited Katz, 
noting that Katz did not involve the use of a government 
informant who reported the conversation content to the 
government. Nor did the Katz Court: 
" • indicate in any way that 
a defendant has a justifiable and 
constitutionally protected expectation 
that a person with whom he is conversing 
will not then or later reveal the conversa-
tion to police." 28 L.Ed.2d 457. 
Therefore, Katz with its warrant requirement is limited to 
those circumstances not involving a participating informant. 
Katz only applies to occasions in which the government seeks 
to surreptitiously monitor phone calls and/or conversations 
in private places. Consequently, Katz is inapplicable to the 
case at bar, for here the state's chief witness, who agreed 
to wear a concealed transmitter, was a volunteer undercover 
agent purticipating in the controlled drug buy with appellant. 
-7-
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Unlike Katz, jn which the recordings were mode for the 
purpose of obtaining evidence of criminal activity, the 
instant case included the use of a transmitter primarily 
to provide protection for Kayle Shaw, the undercover 
agent (T.l71). Should a narcotics dealer learn that the 
intended purchaser is actually a narcotics agent, the 
agent's life is placed in serious immediate jeopardy; a 
transmitter allows supporting police officers to move in 
quickly if the transmission reveals that the undercover 
agent is in trouble. 
Appellant alleges that ,Tustice Hhi te misconstruec 
earlier cases on the informant eavesdropping or electron~ 
monitoring topic,particularly Hoffa v. United Sta~es, 385 
U.S. 293, 17 L.E.2d 374 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 38' 
U.S. 206, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); and Lopez v._ United State' 
373 U.S. 427, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963). Although these pre-
Katz opinions arose in the trespass analysis era of the 
United States Supreme Court, United States v. White, supra 
found all three cases to be unaffected by Katz. The Court 
in Hoffa, supra, announced in clear language that the Four 
Amendment offers no protection to a defendant who relies 
upon a colleague's trust, only to learn that the "trusted 
colleague" is a government agent who reports regularly ~ 
-8-
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the authorities. 
"Neither this Court nor anv 
member of it has ever expressed-the 
view that the Fourth Amendment 
protects a wrongdoer's misplaced 
belief that a person to whom he 
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing 
will not reveal it." 17 L.Ed.2d at 
382. 
Since no electronic monitoring occurred in Hoffa, the only 
question presented to the Hoffa court which has relevance 
to this case was the admissibility of the informant's 
testimony. Any attempt to determine from the opinion how 
the Court would have treated the admissibility of testimony 
of an electronically eavesdropping government agent if such a 
person had existed is unproductive speculation. 
Lewis v. United States, supra, concerned the admis-
sibility of narcotics purchased from the defendant at his 
home by an undercover federal narcotics agent. Appellant 
alleged that the deception violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights but the Court rejected the claim, stating: 
"Were we to hold the deceptions 
of the agent in this case constitu-
tionally prohibited, we would come 
near to a rule that the use of 
undercover agents in any manner is 
virtually unconstitutional per se. 
Such a rule would, for example, 
severely hamper the government in 
ferreting out those organized 
crininal activities that are 
characterized by covert dealings 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with victims who either cannot or 
do not protest. A prime example is 
provided by the narcotics traffic." 
17 L.Ed.2d at 316. 
While neither Hoffa nor Lewis involved electronic 
eavesdropping, they do support the general propositions 
that (1) the enforcement of narcotics laws requires stealti 
covert operations, and the participation and cooperation o' 
informants or undercover agents and (2) Fourth Amendment 
protections do not extend to defendants who knowingly vio1 
the criminal laws and who seek acquittal solely because th' 
shared incriminating information and/or engaged in crimina: 
activity with a person who was a covert government age~ 
subsequently testified against them. 
The third case cited by White in supporting its 
holding and more nearly on point to the instant case and 
to the White facts is Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427. 
10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963). In Lopez, the appellant was convic 
of attempting to bribe an Internal Revenue Service agent, 
the offer of the bribe had been secretly recorded by the 
agent during a meeting at Lopez's office. Appellant cla~ 
that the recording should not have been admitted into 
evidence, but the Court rebuffed his challenge, observing 
that the recording device had not been planted during a 
trespass but had been carried in and out by an agent who 
-10-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was there with petitioner's assent, and that the device 
neither saw nor heard more than the agent himself. The 
Court then focused on appellant's real complaint: 
"Stripped to its essentials, 
petitioner's argument amounts to 
saying that he has a constitutional 
right to rely on possible flaws in 
the agent's memory, or to challenge 
the agent's credibility without 
being beset by corrohorating 
evidence that is not susceptible 
of impeachment. For no other 
argument can justify excluding an 
accurate version of a conversation 
that the agent could testify to 
from memorv. We think the risk that 
petitioner- took in offering a bribe 
to Davis fairly included the risk that 
the offer would be accurately reproduced 
in court, whether by faultless memory 
or mechanical recording." 10 L.Ed.2d 
at 471. 
In allowing evidence of the recorded conversation 
the Court in Lopez reasoned that if the conduct and revela-
tions of an agent operating without electronic equipment do 
not violate a defendant's constitutionally justifiable 
privacy expectations: 
" ••• neither does a simultaneous 
recording of the same conversations made 
by the agent or by others from trans-
missions received from the agent to whom 
the defendant is talking and whose 
trustworthiness the defendant necessarily 
risks." 28 L.E.2d at 458. 
Given the antecedent case law analyzed in White, the 
plurality opinion harmonized the surviving cases in the 
-11-
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eavesdropping area and arrived at several reasonable 
conclusions, which while aiding law enforcement safeguard 
constitutional rights of citizens. These conclusions are: 
(1) as the law does not protect a wrongdoer whose trusted 
accomplice is a police agent, neither should it protect 
him when the same agent records or transmits the 
conversation, which is later offered into evidence; (2) 
having resolved any doubts about Rn accomplice being an 
informant, a wrongdoer is unlikely to distinguish between 
probable informers on one hand and probable informers 
with transmitters on the other to the extent requiring 
discrete constitutional recognition of those differences; 
(3) the courts should be wary of erecting constitutional 
barriers to relevant and probative evidence which is also 
accurate and reliable, recognizing that a defendant who has 
no right to exclude an agent's testimony ought not be allm 
to exclude a more accurate version of the events; (4) it 
would be untenable to find that while the undercover agent 
without a warrant has acted "reasonably," once he straps~ 
a transmitter his "reasonable" activities are suddenly 
transformed into an "unreasonable" investigation in viola' 
of Fourth Amendment guarantees. 
Respondent asserts that in the instant case a 
reasonable, legal investigation and arrest occurred. 
-12-
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Although Kayle Shaw was wired with a transmitter for his own 
protection, it was reasonable, proper and in accord with 
applicable law to admit the tape recording and allow the 
jurors to hear the best evidence of what actually transpired 
in The Gym. 
This position is fully supported by Utah law. The 
privacy section of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-401 (Supp. 1977), 
provides the following definition: 
"(2) 'Eavesdropping' means to 
overhear, record, amplify, or transmit 
any part of a wire or oral communication 
of others without the consent of at 
least one party thereto by means of 
any electronic, mechanical, or other 
device." (Emphasis added.) 
This provision certainly provides for and protects the use 
of wired, undercover operatives, and as Kayle Shaw had 
consented to the attachment of the transmitter to his 
person, no violation of Section 76-9-402 occurred. 
Finally, under Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-1 (1953), 
as amended, it is doubtful if a search warrant could have 
been issued. Warrants are limited to the seizure of personal 
property and considerable imagination and judicial creativity 
would have to be employed to equate the sound vibrations of 
a person's voice with personal property. 
As noted by appellant, Michigan is a state which 
has decided that a search warrant is required in these 
-13-
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circumstances. See People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 
N.W.2d 511 (1975), cert. den. 423 u.s. 878, 116 L.Ed.2d 111. 
However, the }1ichigan search warrant statute, Mich. 
Compiled Laws 780.652, is unlike the Utah statute in that 
it authorizes the seizure of personal property and "other 
thing(s]." Perhaps because sound waves can be categoriz~ 
as "other thing[s]" they are therefore seizable, hut no 
such exception is codified in Utah. While acknowledging 
that this court has the power to provide an individual wit: 
greater protection under the state constitution than he 
enjoys under the federal constitution, respondent urges th: 
Court not to adopt the minority Michigan view. Instead, 
this Court should uphold the admissibility of the tape~ 
Such a decision would acknowledge both the genuine individ 
protections of the Fourth Amendment and societal protectio: 
against abandoning the Fourth Amendment to lawbreakers wh· 
use it primarily to shield themselves from criminal culpa· 
bility. In United States v. White, the Court weighed and 
balanced the needs of effective law enforcement against t!:· 
right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seard 
and seizures. Respondent believes that the l"ihi te analysi' 
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POINT II 
AS VARIOUS RULINGS BY THE '.:'RIAL COUR'l' HERE IN 
ACCORD IHTH LAIV, APPELLANT RECEIVED A FAIR TRIAL. 
POINT A 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE 
THE UNDERCOVER AGENT'S FULL VERSION OF THE EVENTS ~'7HICH 
OCCURRED DURING THE PROTRACTED NARCOTICS TRANSACTION; SUSTAIN-
ING APPELLANT'S OBJECTIONS AND THE GIVING OF APPROPRIATE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS CURED OTHER IMPERFECTIONS. 
During the direct examination of Kayle Shaw, he 
was questioned about the conversation that he had with appellant 
while the two men awaited the delivery of the drugs. Shaw 
testified that appellant told him that "he still has an ounce 
of Angel Dust down in his crib [apartment]." (T.39) Appellant 
then moved for a mistrial and the trial court denied the 
motion, stating that while it was a close question as to 
whether this conversation was part of the crime, appellant 
had not been prejudiced enough for a mistrial (T.43-45). 
Later Shaw made the statement that he doubted if he 
would still be alive if appellant had known that Shaw was an 
informant. An objection to the statement was made and sustained, 
the remark stricken, and the jury admonished to disregard the 
answer of the witness (T.l40). 
-15-
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The final complaint concerning Kayle Shaw's testi-
mony is that he said that he had fired his attorney because 
he believed that she was conspiring with appellant to "set 
him up (for assassination) . " (T. 14 2) . Appellant's motion 
for a mistrial was denied and the trial judge said that he 
didn't think the appellant hac been prejudiced and that it 
highly unlikely that the jury's verdict would be based on 
this one stateDent (T.l46). ShaH admit ted on cross-examino: 
that appellant had never threatened him (T.l53). 
Utah case law provides the proper standard for 
determining when a motion for a mistrial should be granted. 
The standard is established in several recent cases, among 
them State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 1323 (1974~ 
State v. Trusty, 28 Utah 2d 317, 502 P.2d 111 (1972). In f 
case unanimous courts affirmed the decisions of the lower c 
to deny motions for mistrial. This Court noted that ami~ 
should be granted if the trial judge believes that an errm 
been made and that "in light of the total Proceeding there 
been such prejudice that the defendant cannot have a fairo 
impartial determination of his guilt or innocence." 517 P.: 
at 1324. 
On review this Court considers these two proposi: 
and should reverse only if it appears that (1) error did oc 
-16-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and(2) substantial prejudice resulted to the extent that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for the error, 
there would have been a different result. 502 P.2d at 114. 
In reviewing the facts this Court acknowledges the authority 
and advantaged position of the trial judge and will not upset 
his ruling unless it clearly appears that he had abused his 
discretion. 517 P.2d at 1324 and 502 P.2d at 114. 
Respondent submits that on review of the record 
and in light of analysis below, this Court will find that the 
trial court carefully and thoughtfully made his rulings and 
he did not abuse his discretion. 
The trial court did not actually determine if the 
first alleged error was in fact error, rather calling it a 
close question, and finding that even if it were error, there 
had not been enough prejudice to warrant a mistrial. Implicit 
in this finding is the determination that the verdict of the 
jury does not hinge on Shaw's reference to appellant's possession 
of Angel Dust. Respondent further submits that under Rule 55 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, the inclusion within Shaw's testi-
mony of appellant's statement that he was in possession of 
Angle Dust was proper. While not admissible as proof of guilt 
of the crime charged, it is admissible as tending to show intent, 
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plan and lack of mistake. 1 
1\c.!ditional support for admission of the statement 
comes from State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977). I· 
reversing a lower court conviction on other grounds, the 
majority rebuffed appellant's claim that testimony v1as adni: 
in violation of Rule 55: 
"The testimony concerning the other 
allegedly criminal acts [the robbery of 
othc•c persons] committed by the defendant 
during the course of the cor:ur1ission of 
the crime with which he was charged, 
were, in fact, eyewitness descriptions 
of the events that occurred." 571 P.2d 
at 1353. 
On this basis a narration of the conversation between appel: 
and Shaw as they a\laitcd delivery of the PCP was proper, e•·, 
if it included a minor referencP to other drucJs to be .sold, 
such a reference not being sufficiently prejudicial to reqc. 
exclusion from Shaw's chronological account of the events~ 
the meeting. 
Regarding the second incident, the sustaining of· 
objection to the improper response and the cautionary admo~ 
tion to the jury cured any potential prejudice. As the ~ 
lRULE 55, OTHER CRIMES OR CIVIL WRONGS. Subject to Rule;· 
evidence that a person committed a crime or civil vnong on 
specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his dispositi 
to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an infer& 
that he committed another crime or civil 1vrong on another 
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such~ 
is admissible when relevant to prove some other material · 
includin<] absence of r;1is take or accident, 1110t i ve, opportti· 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. 
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court remetrked: 
"In the absence of something 
persuasive to the contrary, we assume 
that the jurors were conscientious in 
performing to [sic] their duty, and 
that they followed the instructions 
of the court." 517 P.2d at 1324. 
Respondent submits that because no evidence was offered to 
support the claim of prejudice and in deference to the trial 
court's authority, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
ruling. 
In reference to the third allegation, that a mistrial 
should have been declared after Shaw's remark about his previous 
attorney, respondent urges the Court to sustain the action of 
the trial court in denying the motion. Having found no 
prejudice, the trial judge could not grant a mistrial. The 
credibility of a witness is for the jury to determine, and it 
is unlikely that jurors would have seriously considered Shaw's 
claim that his former attorney, a member in good standing of 
the Utah Bar, would have been involved in an assassination plot. 
The trial judge stated that he did not believe that the 
testimony was dam~ging or prejudicial to appellant, the issue 
was a collateral one with no bearing on the main issue of 
appellant's guilt in distributing a controlled substance for 
value, and he did not believe the jurors would give it another 
thought (T.403-404). Given this inherent incredibility of 
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the testimony, there \vas little likelihood that Shaw's remap 
would have substantial im~act on the jury, as to alter the 
verdict, and the motion for mistrial was properly denied. 
POI!JT B 
THE ALLEGED PROSECUTORH\.L HISCONDUCT IN CLOSING 
ARGUMENT >vAS ACTUALLY PROPER REBUTTAL IN AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
TOTP..L EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL. 
Appellant nade no objections to statements in the 
prosecutor's closing argument, and the general rule is that 
a failure to raise objections at trial precludes the consid~ 
tion of those issues on appeal unless such exceptional circe-' 
stances exist thilt a miscarriage of justice would result if I 
the matter were not considered. State v. Winger, 26 Utah ~ 
118, 485 P.2d 1398 (1971). Appellant cites a California~~ 
People v. Lyons, 50 Cal. 2d 245, 324 P.2d 556 (1958), as prm. 
• i 
ing the exceptions relied upon. Namely, (l) grave doubts 
about defendant's guilt and(2) the inability to obviate or 
cure the alleged error. Respondent contends that evidence 
in the instant case was not evenly divided, so as to make 
the issue of appellant's guilt a close question. Appellant 
presented no evidence at all while the state produced over-. 
whelming evidence of guilt. Respondent also submits that~ 
if error occurred during the argument stage, it was minor, 
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and the trial judge was fully equipped to obviate any potential 
prejudice with appropriate admonishments and further cautionary 
instructions. 
Counsel for appellant included in his closing 
argument a statement (partially Jury Instruction No. 10) which 
informed the jury of the appellant's constitutional right not 
to testify and that no presumption of guilt should arise from 
the exercise of that privilege. He noted that a defendant may 
have several reasons for not testifying - among them his 
satisfaction with the evidence presented or his reluctance 
to be cross-examined (T.458). 
During his argument the prosecutor alluded to 
defense counsel's comments: 
"He read the instruction about the 
defendant not testifying and not creat-
ing a presumption against him and he 
said the reason why the defendant did 
not testify--he said I am a skilled 
prosecutor and I would have had a 
chance to cross-examine him. No question 
about that. I would suggest that maybe 
that is the reason." (T.483) 
Mr. Yocum then observed that Kayle Shaw was cross-
examined for two and one-half hours by two very skilled 
attorneys, yet came through it very successfully, while acknowl-
edging that Shaw had admitted possessing LSD on occasion. 
Respondent contends that the prosecutor's remarks 
were wholly proper. They were in harmony with the argument 
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guidelines of State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 (Utah 1975),and 
State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 (Utah l977),and State v. \VhiL 
-(Utah Case No. 15210, filed 3/13/78),and in accord with the 
constitutional mandate that the prosecution must not commen: 
on the failure of the defendant to testify. See Griffin v. 
California, 380 u.s. 609,14 L.Ed 2d 106 (1965). 
In St.i".te v. Kazda, supra, the prosecutor harJ state 
during closing argul'lent, "The de Fe .,se has presented no evidf 
as to \·1hy the defendant v1as out there. wnat was he duing ou 
there?" As in the instant case, Kazda neither testified nor 
called witnesses. After noting tha~ trial counsel have botl 
a right and a duty to analyze all ~spects of the evidence, 
including what it is or isn't and what it shows and doesn't 
show, the court found the prosecutor's comment to be proper. 
In State v. Eaton, supra, we find an overzealous 
prosecutor who crossed the line between commenting on the tc· 
evidence and commenting specifically on the defendant's fail 
to testify. That case also involved a controlled drug buy! 
during closing argument the prosecutor stressed the fact th' 
only the state's chief witness and the defendant "really knc 
[sic] what took place in that house" and then asked "vlhat de 
the defendant tell us?" Later he referred again to the de~ 
dant's failure to testify and explain. The defendant in~ 
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received a new trial. 
The facts of Eaton are not similar to the instant 
case. Here the prosecutor's emphasis was not on appellant's 
failure to testify, where he merely supported defense 
counsel's comments, rather it was on the thoroughness and 
consistency of Kayle Shaw's testinony. 
The most recent Utah case on this issue, State v. 
White, supra, makes clear that in appropriate circumstances 
the prosecutor may make an observation on a defendant's 
silence, as long as the purpose is not to encourage the 
jury to draw inferences of guilt from what was not said, 
but to see the total picture of the evidence. In ~fuite, also 
a drug case, the defendant was asked on direct examination 
only his name, address, and occupation. During closing 
argument the prosecutor said that because the scope of cross-
examination is limited by the direct examination, he could 
not ask the defendant about how he came to be in possession 
of heroin and cocaine, how much he was being paid for it, etc. 
In affirming the conviction, the Court found the remarks 
a proper part of the prosecutor's analysis of the evidence 
and that the prosecutor merely pointed out what the jury 
already knew--that the defendant had purposely limited his 
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When compared with these three fact patterns, 
it is abundantly clear that the prosecutor's remarks 
in this case were proper and completely within the 
guidelines of constitutjonally permissible evidence 
analysis. Even if this Court finds them to be error, 
they would be harmless under Hodges, ~, ctnd Hilchell, 
supra. 
Appellant also alleges that the trial court 
committed further error by allowing Mr. Yocum to read 
from a transcript of the tape recording when the transcript 
har; earlier been refused admission into evidence. However, 
the prosecutor had personally listened to the tape, which 
had been admitted into evidence, and in refreshing his 
memory of what was on the tape, he is allowed to use any 
writing to jog his memory. HcCormick on Evidence, 2d Ed., 
1973, Chap. 1, § 9, p. 15. The transcript accurately 
represented what he heard and he was therefore properly 
using the transcript for memory refreshing only and so sta~ 
at T. 487. The judge's actual ruling is unclear; he initial 
found Hr. Yocum's use of the transcript objectionable, but 
after the prosecutor argued present recollection refreshed, 
the judge agreed that Hr. Yocum could refer to what was 
on the tape (T.487). Moreover, a prosecutor's closing 
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argument is not evidence and the jury in this case was so 
advised (T.434). 
Respondent rejects appellant's contention that 
the jurors probably drew the inference that the transcript 
of the tape which was available, probative evidence, had 
been kept from them by the court. The jury heard the 
tape during their deliberations and decided for themselves 
what the voices were saying, cognizant that Agent Allred 
had also listened to it and typed a transcription {T.l91). 
Jury Instruction No. 6 clearly charged the jury to consider 
only the evidence, both offered and admitted, and the 
presumption is that the jury did its duty and followed 
its instructions. 
Nevertheless, cases cited by appellant do not 
support his clai~. In Peoole v. Gilmer, 110 Ill.App.2d 73, 
249 N.E.2d 129, 133 (1969), the court found the "determining 
factor was whether there was a reasonable possibility that 
improperly introduced evidence might have contributed to 
the conviction." Respondent contends that it is substantially 
unlikely that the refusal of the court to allow the jury to 
see a transcript that one narcotics officer had made of a 
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tape which the jurors would themselves listen to, combined 
with an earlier remark about the prosecutor's cross-
examination skills, affected the jury's verdict. Unless 
appellant can show that but for these occurrences, if 
deemed error, the jury would likely have returned a not 
guilty verdict, the conviction must stand. Since 
appellant has not met the burden of State v. Eaton, 
supra, respondent urges the Court to reject appellant's 
arguments, no substantial evidence having been 
offered to support an acquittal. 
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POINT C 
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE HAVING BEEN 
CLAIMED FOR VALID REASONS BY BRADLEY RICH, THE TRIAL 
COURT ACTED PROPERLY IN REFUSING TO REQUIRE THE 
ATTORNEY TO TESTIFY. 
For a period of two months in 1977, Bradley 
Rich of the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association repre-
sented Kayle Shaw, who was facing three charges of 
aggravated robbery (T.20,74). 
With the jury absent, appellant called Mr. 
Rich to testify and after several preliminary questions 
asked the witness if he ever had occasion to discuss 
Shaw's work as an undercover agent for the State of Utah. 
Mr. Rich refused to answer the question on the ground that 
a response would require him to divulge a confidence of a 
client (T.357). The attorney's refusal was in complete 
accord with Rule 26(1) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which provides: 
"Subject to Rule 37 and except 
as otherwise provided by paragraph 2 
of this rule communications found by 
the judge to have been between lawyer 
and his client in the course of that 
relationship and in professional 
confidence, are privileged, and a 
client has a privilege (a) if he is 
the witness to refuse to disclose 
any such communication, and (b) to 
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prevent his lawyer from disclosing 
it, and (c) to prevent any other 
witn~ss fro~ disclosing such 
communication if it carne to the 
knowledge of such witness (i) in 
the course of its transmittal 
between the client and the lawyer, 
or (ii) in a manner not reasonably 
to be anticipated by the client, 
or (iii) as a result of a breach 
of th2 lawyer-clicnl relationship. 
The privilege may be claimed by the 
client in person nr by his lawyer, 
or if inco~petent, by his guardian, 
or if deceased by his personal 
representative. The privilege 
available to a corporation or 
association terminates upon 
dissolution." 
The exceptions to this general rule are detailed 
in 26(2) and it is specifically upon 26(2}(a) that appellant 
bases his allegation that the privilege was improperly 
claimed by Mr. Rich and sustained by the court. Rule 
26 (2} (a) states: 
"Such privileges shall not 
extend (a) to a communication if the 
judge finds that sufficient evidence, 
aside from the communication, has been 
introduced to warrant a finding that 
the legal service was sought or obtainc=d 
in order to enable or aid the client to 
commit or plan to commit a crime or 
tort." 
The record shows that Mr. Rich was hired tn repr~ 
sent Shaw on robbery charges and his January lOth appointrn0 
occurred weeks before Shaw made ovc=rtures to Detective 
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carlson about the possibility of becoming an agent. There 
is no evidence to suggest that Shaw hired Mr. Rich to aid 
him in the commission of a crime, and therefore no excep-
zion under 26(2) (a) exists, and the witness properly 
invoked the attorney-client privilege on behalf of Kayle 
Shaw. 
Appellant urged the court to require Mr. Rich 
to respond in camera, stating that the judge could then 
determine for himself whether the communication was 
privileged (T.360). The court refused and deferred to 
Mr. Rich's judgment and knowlege of the facts allowing 
him to claim the privil, :re if he determined that answering 
would violate a confidence (T.363). 
No Utah case supports appellant's claim. A. v. 
District Court of Second Judicial District, 550 P.2d 315 
(Colo. 1976), is distinguishable. It concerned the 
work product exception in a grand jury proceeding. 
People v. Mahan, 1 Utah 205 (1875), is also inapplicable 
as that defendant had consulted with the attorney for 
the ~ole purpose of learning the legal effect of signing 
another's name to a note. Noteworthy here is the excerpt 
cited by appellant, in which Lord Chief Baron is quoted 
as having said: 
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"Where the original ground 
of communication is n1alum in se 
• . • this can never be included 
within ••• professional 
confidence." (Emphasis added.) 
Once again the focus is on the motive for seeking legal 
help, and Kayle Shaw's retention of counsel to represent 
him in felony trials is a legitimate motive. 
Finally, the Kansas case, State v. Henderson, 
205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970), is also distinguishe~ble 
as the defendant was the attorney's client, and the attor~' 
spoke up in an attempt to withdraw as counsel because his 
client was uncooperative and insisted on giving perjured 
testimony. It must be noted, however, that the duty owed 
to the court by a defendant's attorney is intrinsically 
different from the duty owed by the former attorney of a 
witness. That the former may have a higher obligation to 
ke2p perjured testimony from being given is no evidence 
that the latter has the same responsibility. 
Rule 26 allows an attorney to claim the privilege 
on behalf of his client and makes no provision for a 
separate determination by the court that the matter actual! 
is privileged. The trial court, therefore, properly allo~ 
Mr. Rich to claim the privilege and refused to testify 
about confidences shared during his professional relation-
ship with Kayle Shaw. 
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POINT D 
THE GRANTING OF A CONTINUANCE RESTS IN THE 
SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred 
in not granting a continuance over a weekend so 
that Carolyn Nichols, Kayle Shaw's former attorney, 
could testify. Appellant wanted to question Ms. Nichols 
about Shaw's statement that she and appellant were 
planning to have Shaw murdered. After considerable 
argument (T.400-404), the court made the following ruling 
in denying appellant's request: 
"THE COURT: I can't see that 
that testimony or that evidence is 
that damaging or prejudicial to the 
defendant, frankly. We spent 
considerable time on collateral 
matters that didn't even bear on the 
main issue of this trial and it seems 
to me that that was one of them. I 
don't feel that the Jurors are going 
to give any attention to that particular 
part of the testimony. They will see if 
[sic] for what it was and that was just 
simply a conclusion or a statement of 
the witness and I think he was more or 
less pressured into saying something 
on the stand and that just happened to 
be it. I don't feel that--if your 
witness was available I would consent 
to certainly let you reopen for the 
purpose of putting her on the stand 
and attempting to elicit her testimony 
but I just feel in the interest of --
in the interest of time and for an 
orderly trial we should proceed until 
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conclusion. I don't think we con 
finish today. In fact, we have 
discuHscd it so long now that I 
am sure that we can't. I would 
deny the motion to continue it 
until Monday which is past the 
wP~~cnd and we will proceed in the 
m~:rning." (T.403-404). 
State v. Noosman, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975), 
announced the stundard of rev1c·:J in <1ctcrmini.ns if thee 
refusal to grant a continuance was plejudicial error: 
"The granting of a continuance 
of a case is a matter resting in the 
sound discretion of the trial judge, 
and that discretion will not be 
interfered with on appeal except 
where the court clearly abused its 
discretion in the matter." 
It is clear from the trial judge's statement that 
he found that whole area of testir1ony for which the continua 
was sought to be collateral to the r1ain issue, in no way 
damaging or prejudicial to appellant, and time consur1ing 
and inconvenient to the court. These findings rebut 
appellant's claim that the testimony would have been materii 
likely to have affected the jury's verdict, and of little 
inconvenience to the court, three factors which he cites 
as necessary under a 1976 Alaska decision, Salaz~r v. State,' 
P.2d 66 (Alaska 1976). In that case the appellant, convicted 
of murder, was g. ~ntcd a new trial because the court fou~ 
that the expected testimony of an absent police officers 
that he could see the victim's car from tho road Hou1d he 
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material to appellant's defense, where the state's theory 
of the case was that the deceased's car could not be seen 
from the road and appellant knew it was there only because 
he had committed the killing. 
The crucial nature of the denied testimony, so 
clearly apparent in Salazar, is not present in the instant 
case. Here, the trial judge reasonably concluded that the 
jurors would not take seriously Shaw's allegations of a 
death plot. 
The trial court made reasonable, proper findings 
in his refusal to deny a weekend continuance pursuant to 
his authority under Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which allows the exclusion of admissible evidence, and 
therefore did not abuse his discretion. Respondent urges 
the court to reject appellant's claim. 
POINT E 
AS NO SIGNIFICANT ERRORS OCCURRED IN THE CONDUCT 
OF THE TRIAL, THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL, CUMULATIVE EFFECT. 
Respondent submits that the trial court conducted 
a fair trial for appellant and has offered evidence and case 
law in previous sections which demonstrate that neither 
the prosecutor nor the court committed prejudicial error. 
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State v. St. Cl<1ir, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2c1 323 (]: 
cited as support by appellant is not analogous to the insbm 
case. Paul St. Clair had been convicted of murder and sen-
tenced to death, and the court then, as now, scrupulously 
searched the record in death-penalty cases for significant 
error, 1vhether raised on appeal or not. The errors complainel 
of in that case were individually significant, though not 
prejudicial, and the court declded that signjficant errors 
can have a cumulative prejudicial effect. In the instant 
case there were no significant errors. 
Appellant has not shown that the outcome would 
have been different even if claimed errors had not occurred 
and his conviction should therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Because warrantless, electronic monitoring of 
an undercover narcoticsagent is allowed by the United 
States Supreme Court and authorized by the need to protect 
the lives of the agents, and because no prejudicial errors 
were committed at trial, respondent urges an affirmation 
of the verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRI\IG L. BARLO\v 
Assistant Attorney Genccal 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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